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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 15/05/2006 Accident number: 123 
Accident time: 11:15 Accident Date: 25/05/1998 
Where it occurred: Boundozi Country: Afghanistan 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report:  [No date recorded] 
ID original source: none Name of source: MAPA/UNOCHA 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: P2Mk2 P4Mk1 AP 
blast 
Ground condition: agricultural 
(abandoned) 
hard 
Date record created: 12/02/2004 Date  last modified: 08/07/2005 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 2 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
inadequate metal-detector (?) 
inadequate training (?) 
long handtool may have reduced injury (?) 
partner's failure to "control" (?) 
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?) 
use of pick (?) 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
safety distances ignored (?) 
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 Accident report 
An investigation on behalf of the UN MAC was carried out and its report made briefly 
available in October 1999. The following summarises its content. 
At the time of the accident the demining team were using a one-man drill in a two-man team. 
The victim had been a deminer for eight years. It was 14 days since his last leave and five 
months since his last revision course. The accident occurred in an agricultural area and the 
ground was described as "hard". 
The investigators determined that the victim was working normally and registered a detector 
reading, so marked the spot and began prodding towards it. Before he reached the marked 
point an undetected mine detonated at 11:15. They found that he was working in a squatting 
position without wearing his helmet. They also found that he "ignored" correct prodding 
procedure and so applied pressure directly onto the pressure plate of the mine. 
The Team Leader stated that the victim was working properly and that the accident was 
caused by poor survey not identifying the kind of mine present. 
The Section Leader said that the victim was working properly and the task should have been 
allocated to a mine-dog team. 
The victim's partner was ten metres away and said that he was working properly and the 
accident was unpreventable. 
The victim was not interviewed by the investigators. 
 
Conclusion 
The investigators determined that the victim prodded at the wrong angle and so detonated the 




The investigators recommended that survey teams gather information about mine types 
accurately, that Team Leaders ensure that deminers lie prone and prod at the right angle 
while wearing helmets. They recommended that the Section Leader in this case should be 
disciplined and that Team Leaders should always try to identify the mine type involved in an 
accident. [The victim identified the mine himself in a later interview – see Related papers.] 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 159 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: yes 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: ot recorded 
Protection issued: Helmet 
Thin, short visor 
Protection used: none 
 







See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
An initial accident summarised the victim's injuries as "multiple wounds face and foreign 
bodies both eyes and deep injuries shoulder and neck".  
The victim described his own injuries as "superficial facial injuries, one fragment in his 
shoulder, and shock".  
He spent two weeks in hospital, then returned to work.  
In July 1998, he had no facial scarring or sight-loss when interviewed by the researcher. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because the victim 
was workout a visor and was not corrected.  
The field supervisors in this accident appear to have been unaware that it was against the 
rules to wear no helmet and visor or to work squatting, which implies that their training may 
have been inadequate. The secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate training”. The 
investigators remained unaware that the victim was using a pick. Their harsh criticism of field 
inefficiencies must be seen in the context of their inquiry not being made for three months 
after the accident. The researcher's own informal inquiry uncovered more than their own. It 
may be understandable that the deminers appear to have deliberately misled them.  
The use of the pick and a squatting/kneeling position to "excavate" were both in breach of UN 
requirements, but not in breach of the demining group's unauthorised variations to those 
requirements.  The failure of the UN MAC to either listen to field feedback and adapt SOPs for 
local conditions, or enforce their own standards may be seen as a management failing. 
It is possible that the visor was too damaged to see through properly (as was seen frequently 
during 1998, 1999), in which case the failure to provide useable equipment may represent a 
further management failing. 
In 1999, the manager of the UN MAC wanted to add the comment that Afghanis were 
reluctant “to take responsibility for their own action” and supervisors were reluctant to 
"criticise"/correct their subordinates. He added that these were “cultural issues…not easily 
overcome”.  
The agency that was used to make investigations for the UN MAC (based in Pakistan) at this 
time was frequently constrained by lack of funds, staff and transport. At times their movement 
was constrained by safety concerns. As a result, investigations were frequently delayed by 
weeks.  
Related papers 
The file included maps of the site and photographs showing a hard hillside with patches of 
scrubby grass. 
The victim was interviewed in the field (working again after a few weeks) and said he had 
been a deminer for eight years. The accident occurred while he was excavating a detector 
reading in a semi-prone position (both knees were on the ground). He got a detector reading 
(using a “Phillips” detector) and marked the reading with three stones.  
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He started working from the closest stone to the middle stone with a pick and when he 
reached the middle marker there was a P2 Mk2(/1) mine under the marker.  
The victim said that the  “Philips” detector was not capable of detecting this mine [“Philips” is 
an Afghan synonym for the Schiebel.] When asked how he knew it was this mine, the victim 
said that others were found later and since the blast was too small for other mines, it was 
decided that he had “picked” onto one of these.  
 
The photograph above shows him recreating  the position he was in relative to the mine when 
the accident occurred. 
The victim said that he wore his visor, but partly raised.  
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